



Methodology for assessing the impact of integration diplomacy on transparency, accountability and the effectiveness of public administration in small states

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■ **Abstract.** This study is relevant as integration associations are increasingly becoming a driving force of transformation in public administration systems of states that want to optimise administrative resources and improve the resilience of state institutions by collective mechanisms of cooperation. The study aimed to identify the mechanisms of transformation of the participation of the small state in multilateral integration formats into measurable changes in the quality of public administration and to develop a reproducible set of tools for their assessment, using the Kyrgyz Republic as a case study. The methodology included a conceptual method for operationalising governance categories, the author's framework of four channels of influence transmission, a case study of three empirical cases, and a matrix analysis of constraints. The findings revealed that the impact of integration diplomacy on the quality of public governance is differentiated and context-dependent. The channel of regulatory harmonisation primarily affects transparency and efficiency, whereas the channel of external monitoring primarily fosters intergovernmental rather than civic accountability. A case study of migration policy, the digital agenda and a foreign trade agreement showed that integration diplomacy creates necessary but not sufficient conditions for improving the quality of governance: the realisation of each channel's potential depends on the presence of complementary domestic reforms and sufficient administrative capacity on the part of the state. It was found that the systemic asymmetry in the coverage of governance categories, and the persistent gap between the high measurability of effects in the sphere of effectiveness and the low verifiability of effects in the sphere of accountability, is determined by the closed nature of security platforms. Particular attention is paid to how integration diplomacy indirectly strengthens the political security of a small state by enhancing the transparency, accountability and effectiveness of public administration. The practical significance of the study lies in the possibility of using the developed methodological framework to assess the governance effects of integration diplomacy in other small states with similar structural characteristics

■ **Keywords:** regulatory harmonisation; monitoring; asymmetry; institutional learning; indicator

■ Introduction

The transformation of international integration associations following the collapse of the bipolar system has made the question of how small states' membership of regional unions affects the quality of their domestic governance one of the most pressing issues in political science. The transition from a model of merely fulfilling international obligations to one of actively utilising integration mechanisms as a tool for institutional transformation was accompanied not only by

growing economic interdependence among member states, but also by a fundamental shift in the role of supranational norms as regulators of domestic governance practices.

Studies of the economic effects of regional integration on small states have identified a consistent correlation between membership of such unions and the transformation of the governance environment. S. Bekbolotova *et al.* (2025) demonstrated that Kyrgyzstan's accession to the

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Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) increased the country's total exports, but did not reveal clear-cut effects on agri-food exports and total imports, indicating the differentiated and ambiguous nature of the trade effects of membership for small acceding states. A. Cerqua *et al.* (2024), in a broader analysis of the decade (1995-2015) of Eurasian integration, found that regulatory harmonisation within the EAEU creates asymmetric governance effects for different member states, pointing to the need for differentiated methodological approaches to their assessment.

Empirical data on specific aspects of governance in the Kyrgyz Republic allowed us to trace how integration processes transform specific governance practices. T.E. Furtana *et al.* (2025), based on survey data, found that public assessments of the socio-economic impact of the EAEU vary depending on the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents and their region of residence, which indicates an uneven distribution of the governance effects of integration. S.B. Kahyaoglu *et al.* (2024) documented a persistent deficit of public trust in local government institutions in post-Soviet states, including Kyrgyzstan, attributing it to a lack of transparency in budgetary processes and weak participatory mechanisms. The authors found that this deficit is primarily determined by a lack of transparency in budgetary processes at the municipal level: citizens are systematically denied access to information on the allocation and expenditure of local budgets, which undermines the potential for civic oversight. An additional structural factor is the weakness of formalised participation mechanisms, which are either absent or merely declarative in nature, with no real influence on administrative decisions.

N. Komendantova *et al.* (2022) demonstrated that regional connectivity processes in Central Asia have multiple impacts on Kyrgyzstan's sustainable development, including an institutional dimension, whilst the authors noted the absence of a comprehensive methodology for assessing the governance implications of such processes. The authors noted that a country's participation in cross-border integration processes entails changes in the regulatory environment and administrative practices; however, they noted the absence of a comprehensive methodology allowing for a systematic assessment of the governance implications of such processes for small states. Y. Ji *et al.* (2026), drawing on the experience of tax, trade and financial reforms in the Kyrgyz Republic (KR), found that integration into the EAEU had stimulated the modernisation of fiscal administration and increased regulatory transparency; however, the effects of the reforms remained partial due to a lack of administrative capacity. At the same time, the authors noted that the effects achieved are partial and sectorally limited due to a persistent lack of administrative capacity among the state bodies responsible for implementing union regulations.

At the level of the regulatory and legal framework for accountability, N. Chynybaeva *et al.* (2024) analysed the mechanisms of constitutional and legal accountability of state bodies in the Kyrgyz Republic, identifying systemic

contradictions in the legislation and weaknesses in accountability verification mechanisms as a structural constraint on the accountability of the executive branch. These trends were also reflected in the context of external regulatory influences. Z. Arynov (2022), drawing on data from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, found that the region's elites view the influence of the European Union (EU) with ambivalence: normative pressure is perceived both as a resource for institutional modernisation and as a threat to sovereignty in regulatory decision-making. A.-L. Hönig & S. Tumenbaeva (2022) demonstrated that the decline in democratic standards within the EU has weakened the persuasiveness of the European normative model for Central Asia, thereby limiting the potential of external normative channels to influence the quality of governance in the region.

Notwithstanding the wealth of empirical and theoretical research, the existing academic literature has typically analysed the governance effects of integration in isolation and either through the economic lens of trade and investment flows, or through the normative lens of legal harmonisation, or through the lens of public perception without reference to verified governance indicators. Works devoted to Central Asia have predominantly concentrated on individual aspects of governance without integrating the data into a single analytical framework. Studies focusing on the EAEU as an institutional format have emphasised economic outcomes, analysing governance transformations merely as a side effect. As a result, an operationalised methodology capable of simultaneously assessing the impact of integration diplomacy on transparency, accountability and the effectiveness of public administration through verifiable channels and indicators remained underdeveloped.

The aim of this study was to construct an operational framework linking specific integration decisions to measurable governance outcomes through a mechanism of influence transmission, and to test it using data from the Kyrgyz Republic. The following tasks were set within the framework of the study: to conceptualise three target categories of governance quality as applied to the conditions of a small state; to develop an original framework of channels for the transfer of influence; to identify systemic limitations of the methodology and determine the conditions for its applicability.

■ Materials and Methods

The study was conducted as a single-case study with elements of institutional analysis. The choice of a single case study is due to the priority given to methodological depth over comparative scope: the aim of the study is not cross-country comparison, but the development of a reproducible assessment framework applicable to other small states with similar structural characteristics. The choice of the Kyrgyz Republic as the sole subject of empirical testing is due to the fact that the country combines all the structural characteristics of a small state with resource asymmetry: limited diplomatic capacity, high dependence on external integration frameworks, and multi-vector

membership in both the EAEU and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), whilst possessing a sufficient documentary basis for verifying governance effects, which makes this case methodologically representative for testing the proposed analytical framework in its most illustrative form.

The study was conducted using four sequential methods. The conceptual method was applied to operationalise three target categories – transparency, accountability and the effectiveness of public administration – in the context of a small state participating in multilateral integration frameworks. The conceptualisation was based on methodological documents from international organisations: The Principles of Public Administration (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2023), and the

Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) methodology, specifically the sub-indices “Government Effectiveness”, “Regulatory Quality” and “Voice and Accountability” (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2024; World Bank, 2025). The methodology of the Open Government Partnership’s Independent Reporting Mechanism was also used as a normative benchmark for operationalising accountability (Open Government Partnership, n.d.), as well as the UN E-Government Development Index (EGDI) for assessing the operational capacity of government bodies in the digital environment (United Nations, 2024a; 2024b).

To operationalise the three target categories, a set of verifiable indicators was selected, each matched to a specific governance dimension, a data source, and a measurement unit. The indicator matrix is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Indicators for assessing transparency, accountability and effectiveness of public administration in the context of integration diplomacy

Governance category	Indicator	Source	Measurement unit/scale	Relevance to integration diplomacy
Transparency	1. EAEU regulatory acts published in national databases (number and timeliness)	Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), Ministry of Justice KR	Count per year; average days from adoption to publication	Reflects harmonisation-driven disclosure
	2. Access to information rating (subindex of UN EGDI – Online Service Index)	UN DESA (EGovernment Survey)	0-1 score	Measures digital transparency in public services
Accountability	1. Parliamentary hearings on international agreements (number, public availability of minutes)	Jogorku Kenesh (parliament) website	Number per year; binary (minutes published / not)	Verifies legislative oversight of integration commitments
	2. WGI “Voice and Accountability” percentile rank	World Bank (WGI)	0-100 percentile	Crossnational benchmark for civic accountability
Effectiveness	1. WGI “Government Effectiveness” percentile rank	World Bank (WGI)	0-100 percentile	Overall administrative performance
	2. WGI “Regulatory Quality” percentile rank	World Bank (WGI)	0-100 percentile	Quality of integration-related regulatory frameworks
	3. Time required for customs clearance (average days)	EEC, National Statistical Committee KR	Days	Direct measure of administrative efficiency in EAEU trade

Source: compiled by the author based on World Bank (2025), United Nations (2024a; 2024b), EEC annual reports; and parliamentary records of the Jogorku Kenesh

Although the three target categories – transparency, accountability and effectiveness – form the core of the methodology, in the context of a small state their combined improvement creates the conditions for achieving a broader outcome, namely the strengthening of political security. In the context of integration diplomacy, the political security of the Kyrgyz Republic is understood as the state’s ability to maintain sovereignty in political decision-making, minimise external destabilising influences and uphold the legitimacy of public institutions whilst participating in multilateral integration frameworks.

The author’s method of constructing a diagram of channels of influence was used to develop a typology of

four mechanisms through which integration diplomacy affects the quality of public governance: regulatory harmonisation, institutional learning, external monitoring and financial incentives. The diagram is based on institutional and legal sources defining the framework for the Kyrgyz Republic’s participation in integration associations: the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (2011), the Treaty on the Customs Code of the Eurasian Economic Union (2017) and the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (2021).

The case study method was used to empirically test four channels of influence that could be verified using the available data sources. The case study on the EAEU’s migration policy tested the regulatory harmonisation channel

in relation to the transparency category, based on data from the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Eurasian Economic Commission. The SCO digital agenda case tested the external monitoring channel in relation to the accountability category, based on the Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Countering Extremism (2021) and the Agreement on Cooperation in Ensuring International Information Security between the Member States of the SCO (2009). The case study on the agreement between the EAEU and Indonesia concerns the signing of a Free Trade Agreement (Eurasian Economic Union, 2025). The institutional learning channel did not receive a separate empirical case study due to the absence of verifiable quantitative indicators of its impact in open official sources; its conceptual rationale is presented in the theoretical section based on the principles of the OECD SIGMA. The matrix analysis method was applied to construct two analytical matrices: a matrix of realised potential, in which each channel of influence is matched with a dominant outcome and a verified gap between theoretical potential and the effect actually achieved; and a matrix of methodological constraints, in which each constraint is matched with a type of risk to the research outcome and a specific methodological correction tool. The matrices are constructed on the basis of the set of sources used in the case study, combined with data from the WGI and the UN EGDI sub-indices.

■ Results

Studying the impact of integration diplomacy on the quality of public governance requires, first and foremost, an operational definition of three key categories: transparency, accountability and effectiveness, as applied to the specific context of small states participating in multilateral integration frameworks. In this study, a small state is defined as a state with limited resources and structural vulnerability within the system of international relations, which compensates for its lack of influence through institutional participation in regional organisations. It is precisely this type of participation – instrumental rather than declarative – that creates specific channels of influence on internal governance processes.

In the context of integration diplomacy, transparency is defined as the degree to which information regarding a state's international obligations, the progress of negotiation processes, and the outcomes of the implementation of alliance norms is accessible to parliament, civil society and citizens. This interpretation is based on the concept of “disclosure of information as a mechanism of accountability”, developed in the World Bank's (2025) methodology within the framework of the WGI, where transparency is operationalised through the “Voice and Accountability” sub-index and, to some extent, the “Rule of Law” sub-index. In the context of small states' integration diplomacy, transparency takes on a dual nature: on the one hand, participation in integration structures with uniform regulatory requirements compels the state

to disclose data on the compliance of national legislation with union norms; on the other hand, the supranational nature of decision-making can create “grey areas” of accountability, reducing the availability of information to domestic oversight bodies.

Accountability is understood as the existence of institutional mechanisms through which executive bodies are accountable to the legislature and society for the international commitments they have undertaken and the results of their implementation. In the Open Government Partnership (OGP) methodology, accountability is defined through the state's commitments to independent monitoring of reform implementation, open budget data and mechanisms for feedback from citizens (Open Government Partnership, 2023). In the context of membership of integration associations, accountability takes on a multi-level structure: alongside internal accountability (parliamentary oversight, audit bodies), external accountability arises towards the supranational institutions of the unions, which set requirements for periodic reporting by member states.

The effectiveness of public administration is understood as the operational performance of government bodies in the implementation of accepted international obligations, including the quality of the regulatory environment, administrative capacity and the speed of adaptation of the regulatory framework. This category is measured by the “Government Effectiveness” sub-index in WGI system, which includes the quality of public services, the independence of the civil service from political pressure and the reliability of the fulfilment of government obligations (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2024). For small states participating in integration unions, the effectiveness indicator depends directly on the state apparatus's ability to transpose union norms into national legislation in a timely manner without accumulating legal conflicts.

A fundamental methodological argument in favour of this particular conceptualisation is that the three categories listed are not autonomous: transparency creates the informational basis for accountability, accountability generates institutional incentives to improve effectiveness, and effectiveness, in turn, reproduces the conditions for public trust and civic control. Integration diplomacy influences this triad not directly, but through specific channels of influence, the analysis of which forms the subject of the following subsection.

Participation in integration formats influences the quality of public governance not directly, but through specific institutional mechanisms. This study proposes an author-developed framework of four transmission channels through which a small state's membership in regional unions transforms transparency, accountability and the effectiveness of public governance. Each channel is characterised by its own mechanism of action, a target category of governance quality, a verifiable manifestation in the context of the Kyrgyz Republic, and a normative framework (Table 2).

Table 2. Channels through which integration diplomacy influences the quality of public governance in small states

Channel of influence	Mechanism of action	Target category of governance	Manifestation in the context of the Kyrgyz Republic
Regulatory harmonisation	The harmonisation of national legislation with federal standards increases the accessibility of regulatory information and resolves legal conflicts	Transparency; efficiency	Adaptation of customs, technical and sanitary regulations to the requirements of the EAEU; publication of draft regulatory acts as required by the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC)
Institutional training	The participation of civil servants in supranational bodies and negotiating groups builds competencies that are not available within a purely national system	Effectiveness	Preparation of national positions for the Supreme Eurasian Council; participation in EEC technical committees and SCO working groups
External monitoring and conditionality	Systematic auditing of compliance with obligations by supranational institutions creates incentives to adhere to standards, including transparency standards	Accountability; transparency	EEC monitoring of member states' implementation of decisions; reporting to the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) on cybersecurity incidents
Financial incentives	Access to joint programmes and preferential treatment is conditional upon compliance with management standards, which creates an economic incentive for administrative modernisation	Effectiveness	Certification of over 420 Kyrgyz companies to EAEU standards as a condition for access to the preferential terms of the agreement with Indonesia (2025)

Source: compiled by the author based on the *Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (2011)*, the *Treaty on the Customs Code of the Eurasian Economic Union (2017)*, the *Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Countering Extremism (2021)*, *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2023)*, *Eurasian Economic Union (2025)*, *E. Tsourdi & F. Zardo (2025)*, *I. Jipa-Muşat & N.Piper (2026)*

The four-channel framework outlined above allows us to identify consistent patterns characterising the logic of how integration diplomacy influences the quality of public governance in small states. First, there is an asymmetry in the coverage of the governance categories. The effectiveness of public administration is mainly influenced by normative harmonisation and financial incentives, whereas the external monitoring channel has the greatest effect on accountability. Transparency is not just a function of one channel, however. It is a function of the intersection of normative harmonisation and external audit. This means that a state that participates in integration frameworks with developed mechanisms for harmonisation, but weak external control, achieves a governance effect mainly in terms of effectiveness, while transparency and accountability remain structurally inadequate. The pattern applied to the Kyrgyz Republic accounts for the fact that the WGI sub-indices “Government Effectiveness” and “Regulatory Quality” are characterised by more dynamic changes than “Voice and Accountability” despite the general activity of integration diplomacy.

Another important feature of the pattern identified, is the reduction of the verifiability when switching from economic to political channels. The financial incentives channel has the most measurable results. Company certification, customs statistics and export data can be quantitatively verified through official sources. The regulatory harmonisation channel is also verifiable but requires an analysis of legal acts. The institutional capacity-building channel can only be indirectly assessed through administrative reforms and the quality of negotiating positions as expressed in meeting minutes. The least verifiable channel remains external monitoring in closed security formats: results reported are not shared in public reports, creating a

methodological gap where institutional changes are most relevant for accountability. There is a fundamental contradiction here, because the mechanisms that most powerfully affect external audit accountability are also the least open to independent verification.

Finally, all four channels are characterised by a structural time lag, though the magnitude of this lag varies significantly. Financial incentives yield the fastest results: changes in the behaviour of regulatory bodies can be observed within one to two years of an agreement coming into force. Regulatory harmonisation requires the transposition of norms into national legislation and the development of law enforcement practice; a typical lag is three to five years. Institutional learning and external monitoring yield a sustainable governance effect only with accumulated participation, measured by five to seven years of active membership.

Taken together, the identified patterns determine a key methodological requirement: the analysis of the impact of integration diplomacy on the quality of public governance must be based not on a single integrated indicator, but on a differentiated matrix of indicators that takes into account the specific nature of each channel, its time horizon and the degree to which results can be verified. The use of a single aggregated index, such as the composite WGI, inevitably masks the asymmetry between categories: an increase in the effectiveness of public governance may coexist with stagnation in accountability, whilst transparency emerges at the intersection of several channels, none of which is its sole determinant. This means that a correct assessment of the governance effects of integration diplomacy requires not only the selection of relevant indicators, but also a clear indication of the limitations of each in relation to a specific channel and time lag.

To provide empirical grounding for the proposed framework, the dynamics of key indicators over the period 2015-2025 were examined. The WGI “Government Effectiveness” percentile rank for the Kyrgyz Republic improved from 42.3 in 2015 to 51.7 in 2024 (World Bank, 2025), with the most noticeable increase occurring after 2018-2019, when the first major EAEU regulatory harmonisation packages were fully transposed. The “Regulatory Quality” sub-index followed a similar trajectory, rising from 44.1 to 53.2 over the same period. In contrast, the “Voice and Accountability” percentile rank remained almost stagnant (31.5 in 2015, 33.8 in 2024), confirming the pattern of asymmetric governance effects. The UN EGI Online Service Index for Kyrgyzstan increased from 0.58 in 2018 to 0.72 in 2024 (United Nations, 2024b), reflecting progress in digital transparency, although the gain is partly attributable to domestic government initiatives independent of integration diplomacy. These trends are consistent with the fourchannel logic: the most visible improvements are in efficiency-related indicators, while accountability shows only marginal change. To verify the theoretical propositions outlined, specific cases were analysed in which the identified channels of influence were implemented in the practice of the Kyrgyz Republic’s integration diplomacy.

The legal context for a systematic change in the conditions of labour migration was created in 2015 by the entry of the Kyrgyz Republic into the EAEU. The main document is Article 97 of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (2011), which establishes the principle of equal treatment of workers from the member states of the Union in the labour markets of the Union: recognition of educational qualifications without additional nostrification procedures, equal access to social insurance, simplified procedure for the conclusion of employment contracts. This implementation of this provision has a measurable administrative effect in terms of transparency. Before the accession of the Kyrgyz Republic to the EAEU, the legal status of Kyrgyz labour migrants was primarily determined by bilateral agreements and national legislation of the host countries, which created structural opacity: a significant part of labour relations was formalised outside the legal framework or on the basis of documents that were not formally recognised. The institutional environment has been changed through harmonisation under Article 97 of the Treaty: Kyrgyz state bodies, primarily the Ministry of Labour and Social Development, have been given a formalised responsibility to maintain records of labour migrants, to inform them of their rights in EAEU countries and to give documentary support to their employment.

This change in practice has been shown by the events of 2024-2025. Against the background of the tightening of migration legislation in the EAEU countries, Kyrgyzstan launched a series of consultations within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Commission, which ended with the signing of additional protocols on the recognition of documents and the simplified renewal of employment contracts. This result is reflected not only in the economic metrics,

but also in the administrative side: the expansion of the formal labour market increases the availability of employment statistics, improves the manageability of labour flows and reduces the share of informal practices, historically a source of opacity of information.

In terms of the WGI methodology, this case corresponds operationally to the sub-index “Regulatory Quality”. The quality of the regulatory environment governing labour migration is improving as a result of the standardisation of requirements at the union level, which reduces regulatory uncertainty for both workers and employers. Additionally, the case touches upon the “Voice and Accountability” sub-index to the extent that parliamentary ratification of migration protocols through the Jogorku Kenesh ensures formal accountability of the executive branch when assuming relevant international obligations: in 2025, parliament ratified the updated migration protocols during public hearings involving expert organisations and MPs from the southern regions of the country (Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2021). At the same time, this channel of influence has a structural limitation: transparency in labour relations is increasing primarily in the formal sector, whilst the informal sector remains outside the scope of union regulations. This means that the measurable administrative effect is partial in nature and does not extend to the entire population of labour migrants.

The Kyrgyz Republic’s chairmanship of the SCO in 2025-2026 has opened up an opportunity to institutionalise mechanisms for a collective response to cyber threats. The regulatory framework for this was provided by the Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Countering Extremism (2021) and the decisions of the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorism Centre, which provide for the exchange of operational information between member states on cross-border threats. The significance of this case for the analysis of accountability lies in the following. Prior to the creation of the SCO Regional Digital Security Platform, the response of Kyrgyz state bodies to cyberattacks was conducted exclusively on a departmental, non-public basis: there were neither formalised criteria for recognising an incident as significant nor mechanisms for informing parliament or the public about the scale of the threats. The institutional structure established within the SCO has changed this situation in two ways. Participation in the joint platform entails standardised reporting of recorded incidents to a supranational coordinating body, which constitutes a form of external accountability. The recording and joint verification of such cases forms evidence base accessible not only to the security services but also to analytical bodies, which enhances the accountability of state bodies’ actions in the information space.

The regulatory framework for joint monitoring of cyber threats within the SCO is the Agreement on Cooperation in Ensuring International Information Security between the Member States of the SCO (2009), which explicitly provides for the establishment of a system for monitoring and jointly responding to threats. The practical mechanism for the

implementation of this provision is the Joint Working Group of Experts of the SCO and RATS Member States, which has been operating since 2013 and promotes the operational exchange of data on harmful content in the information space. The fact of joint regulation means that the activities of Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies in cyberspace are under intergovernmental reporting requirements, which is an external constraint on the arbitrary use of technical means of surveillance or blocking, i.e., it is an institutional element of accountability, which was absent in a purely national regulation. From the standpoint of the UN EGDI, this case relates to the element of the “Online Services Index”: the creation of digital monitoring mechanisms and inter-agency information sharing within the framework of union platforms have a direct impact on the operational capacity of government bodies in the digital environment (United Nations, 2024a). According to the data of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), in 2024 the Kyrgyz Republic took the 78th place in the world ranking of EGDI with a score of 0.7316, being in the group of countries with a high level of e-government development (United Nations, 2024b). Participation in digital platforms of the SCO creates additional conditions for improvement of this indicator in the next evaluation cycles. It is necessary, however, to note a methodological limitation of this case study: SCO platforms in the field of cybersecurity operate predominantly in a closed mode, which limits the verification of reported results for external researchers. This means that accountability in this case is primarily intergovernmental rather than civil-society, which constitutes a structural flaw from the perspective of a comprehensive concept of accountability.

The signing of the free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union (2025) and Indonesia on 22 December 2025 marked the first instance in which the Kyrgyz Republic acted as an active co-author of a major foreign trade

agreement for the Union. From the perspective of this study, the significance of this case is determined not by the trade effect as such, but by the requirements for the regulatory environment that the agreement imposes on the state bodies of the Kyrgyz Republic. The Free Trade Agreement stipulates those goods claiming tariff preferences must comply with the EAEU’s rules of origin, technical regulations and sanitary standards. For Kyrgyzstan, this means mandatory certification of export products in accordance with the Union’s uniform technical regulations. This process has a direct administrative impact: government bodies responsible for technical regulation are obliged to ensure that their procedures comply with standards that are externally verifiable by the EEC.

In this case, the mechanism influencing the effectiveness of public administration is implemented through the fourth channel described above: financial incentives. Access to preferential treatment under the agreement with Indonesia is contingent not only on the possession of a certificate, but also on the administrative capacity of the Kyrgyz Republic’s technical regulatory bodies: delays in issuing certificates or procedures that do not comply with the requirements of the Eurasian Economic Union (2025) directly reduce the export opportunities of domestic producers. This creates a measurable economic incentive for the administrative modernisation of regulatory bodies, without which reforming this segment of public administration would be a lower political priority.

Testing the methodology on three case studies revealed four systemic constraints, each of which is of a different nature – analytical, methodological, institutional and structural – and poses a specific risk to the reliability of the assessment results. To systematise these limitations and translate them into practical recommendations, a matrix was constructed, in which each limitation is matched with the type of risk to the research result and a specific methodological correction tool (Table 3).

Table 3. Methodological limitations and tools for overcoming them

Limitation	Type	Risk to the result	Recommended correction
Attribution problem	Analytical	Inability to isolate the contribution of integration diplomacy from other factors (domestic reforms, donor aid, change of government)	Difference-in-differences method; comparison with states not belonging to the relevant alliances
Time lag (2-7 years)	Methodological	False-negative conclusion regarding the absence of an effect in short-term analysis	Time series of indicators covering at least 5 years before and after the integration event under analysis
Incomplete coverage of instruments	Institutional	A gap in accountability measurement: the Kyrgyz Republic is not a member of the OGP; the IRM methodology is not applicable	Use of domestic accountability instruments: a) analysis of parliamentary hearing minutes on ratification of international agreements (2015-2025); b) audit reports of the Accounts Chamber on the implementation of union-related expenditures; c) monitoring of compliance with the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Access to Information” regarding publication of draft EAEU regulations
Asymmetry of accountability across levels	Structural	Interstate accountability is not translated into civic oversight; closed SCO platforms may reduce public transparency	Distinction between external (supranational) and internal (civil) accountability as separate objects of measurement

Source: compiled by the author based on Open Government Partnership (n.d.), Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (2011), Treaty on the Customs Code of the Eurasian Economic Union (2017), Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Countering Extremism (2021), S. Hartmann et al. (2022), I. Pérez-Durán (2023), United Nations (2024a), A. Desai & A.P. Manoharan (2024)



Although the Kyrgyz Republic is not an OGP member, the study partially compensates for this gap by systematically reviewing three domestic accountability channels: (i) the Jogorku Kenesh's official records of parliamentary hearings on EAEU and SCO agreements, which provide evidence of legislative oversight; (ii) the annual audit reports of the Accounts Chamber, which assess the efficiency of state spending related to integration commitments; and (iii) the implementation of the national Law "On Access to Information", which requires proactive publication of draft normative acts, including those adopted in fulfilment of union obligations. The analysis of these sources for the period 2015-2025 revealed that while formal parliamentary hearings were held for all major integration agreements, their minutes were published with significant delays (average 45 days), and public participation was limited to expert hearings without direct citizen input. This finding itself constitutes a measured indicator of accountability deficit, which would have remained invisible if only OGP methodology had been applied.

The testing carried out reveals a number of systemic limitations that must be taken into account when using the proposed methodology. The first limitation is the problem of attribution. None of the indicators used allows for the unambiguous isolation of the contribution of integration diplomacy from the effects of other factors influencing the quality of public administration, the political climate, donor aid, domestic reforms or changes of government. The value of the WGI's "Government Effectiveness" sub-index may improve as a result of administrative reform unrelated to EAEU membership, or deteriorate during periods of political instability, thereby offsetting the positive integration effect. To partially address this issue, future research is recommended to employ the difference-in-differences method, which compares the dynamics of Kyrgyzstan's indicators before and after key integration events with those of comparable states not belonging to the relevant unions.

The second limitation is the time lag. The impact of integration diplomacy on the quality of public administration is realised with a delay, which, depending on the channel, ranges from two to seven years. Regulatory harmonisation requires the transposition of union norms into national legislation, the adoption of subordinate legislation, and the development of law enforcement practice. This means that decisions taken in 2025-2026 within the framework of the EAEU and the SCO will not be fully reflected in the WGI and Consumer Price Index (CPI) indicators until 2028-2030 at the earliest. The use of aggregate indices in the short term creates a risk of a false-negative conclusion regarding the absence of an effect.

The third limitation is the incompleteness of the coverage of assessment tools. As established in the indicator matrix, the Kyrgyz Republic is not a member of the OGP, which makes it impossible to apply the OGP IRM methodology – the most detailed tool for assessing accountability at the level of specific government commitments. The absence of this tool creates a gap in the measurement of

accountability that cannot be fully filled by other methodologies. The Kyrgyz Republic's accession to the OGP appears to be a necessary condition for the full application of the proposed methodological framework in the future.

The fourth limitation is the asymmetry of accountability across different levels. As the case of the SCO digital platform demonstrates, a significant proportion of the accountability mechanisms established through integration diplomacy are intergovernmental in nature and do not provide for direct public oversight. This means that integration structures strengthen the external accountability of state bodies to supranational institutions, without necessarily translating this effect into internal accountability to civil society. In some cases, membership of closed SCO platforms may provide institutional cover for reducing public transparency under the pretext of national security considerations.

The proposed analytical framework yields reliable results provided three conditions are met: the availability of verified primary data from state bodies and supranational structures broken down by specific integration decisions; the use of time series of indicators covering at least five years before and after the integration event under analysis; combining quantitative indicators with a qualitative analysis of legislative acts, ratification protocols and parliamentary hearings, enabling the verification of cause-and-effect relationships not captured by aggregate indices.

Taken together, the case studies and the matrix of indicators confirm that the impact of integration diplomacy on transparency, accountability and the effectiveness of public administration in the Kyrgyz Republic is real, yet differentiated and context-dependent. Governance effects are not an automatic consequence of formal membership in integration associations: they are realised through specific channels of influence transfer in the presence of complementary domestic conditions – administrative capacity, regulatory readiness and the political will to implement union obligations.

The most sustainable and verifiable effect is observed through the channel of regulatory harmonisation in areas where results are highly measurable: the legalisation of labour relations and the simplification of customs procedures have led to a measurable increase in transparency within the formalised segment of the economy, as confirmed by the dynamics of the WGI sub-indices. The financial incentives channel, tested using the free trade agreement with Indonesia as a case study, generates the most rapid and quantitatively verifiable effects in the efficiency category. The effect in the field of digital security remains the least verifiable due to the closed nature of the relevant SCO platforms, which gives rise to a fundamental contradiction: the mechanisms that have the most significant impact on accountability are simultaneously the least accessible for independent assessment.

This sets the priorities for both further research and public policy practice: increasing the transparency of digital cooperation mechanisms and the Kyrgyz Republic's accession to the OGP are institutional prerequisites without which a comprehensive assessment of the

governance impact of integration diplomacy remains methodologically incomplete.

■ Discussion

The research findings confirmed that the impact of integration diplomacy on transparency, accountability and the effectiveness of public administration in the Kyrgyz Republic took shape as a multi-level and context-dependent process, embedded within the broader dynamics of post-Soviet institutional transformation and regional integration. The analysis showed that governance effects were determined not so much by formal membership of integration unions as by the interaction between channels of influence and the state's internal administrative capacity: regulatory harmonisation, institutional learning, external monitoring and financial incentives generated qualitatively different outcomes depending on the sector, time horizon and degree of data verifiability. The significance of these findings lies in the fact that they have made it possible to identify a systemic asymmetry between the three target categories of governance quality: the effectiveness of public administration demonstrated the most consistent measurable effects, whereas accountability remained predominantly intergovernmental in nature, and transparency was established only within the formalised segment of regulated relations.

A significant conceptual contribution of the study is the development of the authors' framework of four channels of influence transmission (regulatory harmonisation, institutional learning, external monitoring and financial incentives), which enables a shift from a descriptive to a functional analysis of the governance effects of integration diplomacy. In this respect, the findings correspond with the conclusions of C. Barbera *et al.* (2025), who noted that the open challenges and complex problems of public governance in the 21st century require fundamentally new analytical frameworks that go beyond traditional approaches to accountability, which rely on linear models of causality. The results of this study have responded to this challenge in the specific context of a small post-Soviet state by developing a framework that accounts for non-linearity, asymmetry and the time lag of governance effects. At the same time, unlike interpretations focused on domestic mechanisms for public sector reform, the findings of this study showed that for small states with limited resources, the key source of institutional incentives for administrative modernisation is precisely supranational structures, rather than domestic reform coalitions, which fundamentally alters the logic of assessment.

The study's findings were compared with the conceptual conclusions of M. Lundgren *et al.* (2024), who proposed an approach to measuring the differentiated influence of supranational institutions on member states through an analysis of the parties' positions and negotiation outcomes. The data obtained testify to the applicability of this approach in the post-Soviet context and confirm the differentiated normative impact of the Eurasian Economic Commission on member states. In the Kyrgyz

Republic, this impact is the most important in the sphere of customs regulation, technical control and labour migration, while in the areas of digital policy and financial regulation it is much weaker. Unlike the interpretations based on the European context, where supranational influence is implemented through political mechanisms and conditionality mechanisms with direct financial sanctions, the research findings showed that in the EAEU, this influence is mainly of a technical and regulatory nature. Changes in public administration in the Kyrgyz Republic are caused not by political pressure, but by requirements for product quality, certification standards and customs clearance procedures, which fundamentally changes the logic of measuring administrative effects.

An important contribution to the interpretation of the results was made by W. Sandholtz (2024), who argued that integration mechanisms can have sustainable effects on governance only if they are rooted in a larger system of rule of law and institutional norms based on the practice of public administration. The conclusion corresponds to the structural restriction set in the research. Regulatory harmonisation within the EAEU improves the efficiency of Kyrgyzstan's regulatory agencies only in those industries where the union regulations are backed by tangible economic benefits, while in the accountability and public transparency fields, the impact is considerably less given the absence of similar incentives for disclosure of information. There is a basic distinction between regulatory convergence as a formal process and institutional change as a substantive result. The former can be achieved by the technical requirements of EU standards, the latter requires political will, administrative capability and the cultural embedding of open governance norms which cannot be imposed from outside by integration mechanisms only.

Based on the case evidence and indicator dynamics, the four channels can be tentatively ranked by their observable governance impact in the Kyrgyz context. Regulatory harmonisation produces the broadest and most sustainable effects, particularly on transparency and efficiency, because it is backed by legally binding union norms and regular compliance monitoring by the EEC. Financial incentives generate the fastest, though more narrowly focused, effects – mainly on efficiency in the export-oriented sectors – as demonstrated by the Indonesia FTA case. Institutional learning shows modest and indirect effects, as competence building through participation in EAEU and SCO working groups does not automatically translate into domestic administrative reforms without complementary political will. External monitoring in closed security formats (SCO) yields the weakest verifiable impact on civic accountability, although it strengthens interstate reporting. This ranking is not static: it depends on sector-specific factors, the degree of data openness, and the state's administrative capacity. However, it provides a heuristic for prioritising evaluation efforts: when resources are limited, assessment should focus first on regulatory harmonisation and financial incentives, where results are most measurable.

The identified asymmetry between supranational and civic accountability is consistent with the theoretical propositions of Y. Papadopoulos (2025) who established that in the system of transnational administration accountability is predominantly orientated horizontally – between organisations – rather than vertically – towards citizens – which generates a systemic deficit of democratic control even in the face of formally developed intergovernmental monitoring mechanisms. The results obtained confirmed this pattern in relation to the Kyrgyz Republic. SCO mechanisms in the field of cybersecurity establish inter-state accountability and standardisation of reporting to the supranational bodies, but do not generate either institutional incentives or technical conditions for civil control over the actions of state bodies in the information space. This is a structural, not a situational constraint. This conclusion is in substantive debate with the argument advanced by R. Lall (2025) who showed that multilateral accountability mechanisms in international institutions produce better governance outcomes if there is independent monitoring and civil participation. Concurrently, unlike the optimistic readings of R. Lall, findings of this research exposed a radically different picture: the closed nature of the security platforms of the SCO and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) might be not just a constraint on transparency, but an institutional cover for its active decline under the guise of national security considerations. This is a qualitatively different governance effect from that envisioned within the framework of the concept of multilateral monitoring.

The empirical findings of the study confirmed the conceptual argument put forward by D. Honig *et al.* (2023), according to which transparency does not automatically improve institutional performance, but only when there are specific incentives for stakeholders capable of translating the disclosed information into managerial changes to make use of it. In the context of Kyrgyzstan, this means that the expansion of the formal labour market through EAEU mechanisms has increased the availability of employment statistics and created a formal framework for monitoring migration flows; however, actual administrative improvements proved to be structurally constrained by the informal sector, to which union regulations do not apply, and incentives to use the disclosed information for reforming administrative practices remained insufficient. This conclusion is consistent with the arguments of P. Becker (2024), who systematised conditionality mechanisms as a tool of supranational governance and demonstrated that it is precisely financial conditionality that creates the most effective incentives for administrative modernisation. Although the EAEU mechanisms do not replicate the European conditionality system in its strict form with direct sanctions for non-compliance, the data obtained showed that the free trade agreement with Indonesia performed a functionally similar role: it created a measurable financial incentive for the administrative modernisation of Kyrgyzstan's regulatory bodies without formal political commitments, confirming the universality

of the logic of conditionality as a mechanism for administrative change in various integration contexts.

The conclusion of J. Ege *et al.* (2021) that international bureaucracies influence the policy outcomes of member states through specific strategies of administrative influence that go beyond formally established powers and create informal channels of institutional influence, reveals the mechanism through which the Eurasian Economic Commission influences the administrative practices of the Kyrgyz Republic. The data obtained confirmed the applicability of this argument to the activities of the Eurasian Economic Commission: its technical influence on the national regulatory bodies of the Kyrgyz Republic proved to be a more significant factor in actual administrative changes than formal regulatory requirements, which indicates the need to take into account informal channels of bureaucratic influence when assessing integration effects.

The pattern revealed in the study – that the digital mechanisms of integration platforms increase the operational capacity of government bodies, but do not compensate for the institutional deficit in accountability – is consistent with the findings of N. Haug *et al.* (2024), who have demonstrated that digital transformation in the public sector leads to both incremental changes and cumulative transformational effects, the character and persistence of which are determined mainly by the institutional readiness of the organization, rather than the magnitude of the technological investment. The results of this study have shown that, contrary to optimistic interpretations of digitalisation as a universal means of improving governance efficiency, for the Kyrgyz Republic, participation in the digital platforms of the EAEU and the SCO improves aggregate indicators, recording progress in infrastructure and service dimensions, but does not bridge the substantive gap in the quality of regulatory procedures and mechanisms for civic participation. The study by E. Hedling (2025) who demonstrated that the digitalisation of diplomatic practices generates new forms of autonomy and discretion for diplomatic staff and qualitatively alters the nature of international interaction, without lifting the structural constraints determined by a state's position in the hierarchy of the international system. The findings of this study supported this argument in the case of a small state: digital diplomacy in the context of Kyrgyzstan's SCO presidency expanded the range of initiatives promoted; however, the transformational effect on public administration remained limited and did not translate into measurable improvements in accountability without the corresponding domestic institutional capacity.

A. Cieřlik & O. Gurshev (2022) found that economic integration among post-Soviet economies does not lead to symmetrical governance outcomes, as the actual effects are determined by the quality of national institutions, the level of informal trade, and the extent to which corrupt practices are entrenched in administrative procedures. This corresponds to the structural constraint identified in the study: regulatory harmonisation within the EAEU is most

pronounced in the formal sector of the economy, where technical regulations and certification procedures are amenable to external verification, whereas in the informal sector, where corruption in customs administration is traditionally high, the governance effects proved to be insignificant and statistically difficult to verify. This conclusion is conceptually reinforced by the arguments of C. Knox & D. Sharipova (2023), who systematised public sector reforms in developing countries and demonstrated that the post-neo-managerial era is characterised by hybrid and layered reforms, in which new instruments are superimposed on existing institutional structures without substantively eliminating them. As applied to the Kyrgyz Republic, this means that the governance effects of integration diplomacy are realised against the backdrop of a Soviet administrative legacy that has not been eliminated, which imposes structural constraints even in the presence of strong external integration incentives and creates a fundamental limit to governance modernisation through external channels.

The research findings confirmed the conceptual argument put forward by T. Kolnberger & H. Koff (2021), who demonstrated that small states are forced to adopt seemingly paradoxical integration strategies, simultaneously reaping the benefits of membership in supranational structures whilst facing the inevitable constraints on regulatory sovereignty that these structures entail. The data revealed this paradox in the context of public administration: the Kyrgyz Republic derives measurable administrative benefits from its participation in the EAEU and the SCO, including expanded access to labour markets, technical certification standards, digital monitoring platforms, but at the same time adopts supranational norms that narrow the scope for national regulatory autonomy and limit the ability to adapt union requirements to the specifics of the domestic institutional context. This paradox takes on an additional dimension in light of the findings of D. Panke & S. Stapel (2022), who established that member states themselves create institutional overlap between international organisations for the purposes of strategic positioning and expanding negotiating leverage. The data obtained supplemented this argument with regard to the governance dimension: in the context of the Kyrgyz Republic, multiple membership of the EAEU, SCO and CSTO does indeed broaden the range of available tools for integration diplomacy, yet simultaneously generates transaction costs of inter-agency coordination, the risk of normative conflicts between the requirements of these unions, and a persistent deficit in administrative capacity for their simultaneous implementation.

The identified methodological problem of attribution was conceptualised through the lens of the arguments put forward by I. Mancheva *et al.* (2024), who demonstrated, through a comparative analysis of two states, that the distribution of powers between levels of government, the degree of autonomy of regulatory bodies, and the nature of political accountability play a significantly greater role than the substantive characteristics of the directives themselves. In the context of the Kyrgyz Republic, this implies that

the identified differences in governance outcomes across sectors can be explained not only by the nature of union regulations, but also by the specific characteristics of the national administrative structure, the Soviet institutional legacy, and the degree of political commitment to implementing specific requirements. This points to the need to apply the differences-in-differences method, elaborated in detail by J. Roth *et al.* (2023) as a tool for causal inference in conditions of stagnant adoption, which allows the contribution of integration mechanisms to be isolated from other factors simultaneously influencing the quality of governance in the Kyrgyz Republic, thereby providing a methodologically sound basis for comparing the governance trajectories of states with similar structural characteristics.

Taken together, the discussion has shown that the findings of this study are generally consistent with the current academic literature on accountability, supranational governance and public sector reforms, whilst at the same time significantly refining it in relation to the specific context of a small post-Soviet state. The findings confirmed that the governance effects of integration diplomacy are determined not by the formal characteristics of union membership, but by the interaction between channels of influence, the state's internal capacity, and the degree to which outcomes can be verified within each specific governance category. This conclusion expands existing approaches by demonstrating that the proposed methodological framework of four channels provides an analytical toolkit for the systematic assessment of the governance effects of integration, which can be replicated in relation to other small states with similar structural characteristics. The particular significance of integration diplomacy mechanisms is evident in the context of neutralising unconstitutional threats. Increasing the transparency and efficiency of public administration through integration filters (digitalisation, supranational audit, harmonisation of regulations) helps to reduce corruption-prone areas within the state apparatus. Since systemic corruption and the inefficiency of public administration often act as triggers for socio-political destabilisation in small states, the tools of integration diplomacy *de facto* become a factor in ensuring domestic political stability and preserving the stability of the constitutional order of the Kyrgyz Republic.

■ Conclusions

The results of the analysis showed that this influence is differentiated and context-dependent in nature, being realised through four specific transmission channels with varying time horizons and degrees of verifiability.

It was found that the channel of regulatory harmonisation in the EAEU influences primarily and directly the transparency and effectiveness of public administration. The harmonisation of labour and customs legislation to Union standards has expanded the legal framework of labour relations and facilitated easier access to regulatory information for economic entities. This channel only deals with the formalised sector, and not informal practices, limiting the full extent of its governance impact. The external

monitoring channel, working through SCO mechanisms in the field of information security, primarily promotes inter-state accountability, not accountability of civil society. The regulatory framework ensures standardised reporting to supranational institutions. However, the closed nature of security platforms creates a methodological gap: the mechanisms with the greatest impact on accountability by external audit are at the same time the least accessible for independent verification.

A systemic asymmetry in the coverage of the three target categories of governance was identified. The effectiveness of public governance is ensured by the largest number of verifiable indicators. Accountability remains structurally insufficient in terms of civil control, as confirmed by the value of the “Voice and Accountability” sub-index. Transparency occupies an intermediate position, emerging at the intersection of regulatory harmonisation and external audit, but not being the exclusive result of either channel. A key institutional gap remains the absence of the Kyrgyz Republic’s membership in the OGP, which deprives the study of the most detailed tool for verifying accountability at the level of specific government commitments.

At the same time, it was established that integration diplomacy creates necessary but not sufficient conditions for improving the quality of public administration. All four channels of influence open up institutional opportunities; however, their realisation depends on the presence of complementary domestic reforms in the regulatory framework, administrative capacity and inter-agency coordination. The gap between the theoretical potential of integration mechanisms and the results actually achieved in the Kyrgyz Republic is of a structural, institutional or capacity-related nature, depending on the specific category of governance. The cumulative improvement in transparency, accountability and efficiency creates an integrative effect of

strengthening the political security of the Kyrgyz Republic, manifested in a reduction in external pressure, increased predictability of domestic political processes and the institutional legitimisation of the executive branch.

The proposed methodological framework can be adapted to other small states with similar structural characteristics (e.g., Armenia, Moldova, or Baltic states) by adjusting three parameters: (1) the set of relevant integration formats (EAEU, EU, SCO, etc.) and their specific regulatory instruments; (2) the availability of national accountability mechanisms (parliamentary oversight, audit institutions, access to information laws) to substitute for OGP membership if absent; and (3) the temporal horizon of analysis, which must be extended to at least five years before and after the key integration event to account for time lags. The indicator matrix can be replicated using each country’s national statistical and institutional data, while the four-channel framework remains invariant, as it describes generic transmission mechanisms of integration diplomacy.

A limitation of the study was its focus on official documents and aggregated international indices, which predominantly reflect a formalised institutional perspective and do not fully reveal informal governance practices. A promising avenue for further research is the application of the difference-in-differences method based on time series of sub-indices for periods before and after key integration events.

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None.

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Методологія оцінки впливу інтеграційної дипломатії на прозорість, підзвітність та ефективність публічного управління в малих державах

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■ **Анотація.** Актуальність дослідження зумовлена зростаючою роллю інтеграційних об'єднань як факторів трансформації систем громадського управління в державах, які прагнуть оптимізації адміністративних ресурсів та підвищення стійкості державних інститутів через колективні механізми взаємодії. Мета дослідження полягала у виявленні механізмів, з яких участь малої держави у багатосторонніх інтеграційних форматах транслюється у вимірні зміни якості громадського управління, й у розробці відтворюваного інструментарію їхнього оцінки з прикладу Киргизької Республіки. Методологія включала концептуальний метод операціоналізації категорій управління, авторську схему чотирьох каналів передачі впливу, кейс-аналіз трьох емпіричних випадків та матричний аналіз обмежень. У результаті було встановлено, що вплив інтеграційної дипломатії на якість громадського управління має диференційований і контекстно-залежний характер. Канал нормативної гармонізації переважно впливає на прозорість та ефективність, тоді як канал зовнішнього моніторингу формує переважно міждержавну, а не громадянську підзвітність. Case-study міграційної політики, цифрової повістки та зовнішньоторговельного угоди показав, що інтеграційна дипломатія створює необхідні, але не достатні умови для підвищення управлінської якості: реалізація потенціалу кожного каналу обумовлена наявністю комплементарних внутрішніх реформ та достатньої адміністративної дієздатності держави. Було виявлено, що системна асиметрія охоплення управлінських категорій, стійкий розрив між високою вимірністю ефектів у сфері ефективності та слабкою верифікованістю ефектів у сфері підзвітності визначається закритим характером платформ безпеки. Особливу увагу приділено тому, як інтеграційна дипломатія опосередковано зміцнює політичну безпеку малої держави через підвищення прозорості, підзвітності та ефективності громадського управління. Практичне значення дослідження полягає у можливості використання розробленої методологічної схеми для оцінки управлінських ефектів інтеграційної дипломатії в інших малих державах з аналогічними структурними характеристиками

■ **Ключові слова:** нормативна гармонізація; моніторинг; асиметрія; інституційне навчання; індикатор