



## Effective governance and the doctrine of “total defence” as factors of state stability in wartime

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■ **Abstract.** In wartime, effective governance and the doctrine of “total defence” are critical factors that ensure the stability, security, and sovereignty of the state. The purpose of this study was to investigate the aspects of the effectiveness of management of the national security and defence system of the state. Analytical modelling of the systemic components of Ukraine’s resilience in wartime through the lens of the total defence doctrine and the concept of social self-organisation was used. The study investigated the barriers and difficulties in preparing the public authorities of Ukraine for effective management of resistance to the threats of hybrid warfare and threats of a full-scale high-intensity war along the entire line of the state border of Ukraine with the Russian Federation. The study analysed the specific features of the low-intensity hybrid war of 2014-2021 and the specific features of the initial stage of the high-intensity war of 2022. The study considered the achievements, omissions, shortcomings, and mistakes of public administration bodies and official systems in the first stages of the full-scale invasion of the Russian occupation forces into the cities and villages of Ukraine. It was shown that as a result, the Ukrainian defence forces were unable to organise an effective response to the large-scale invasion of Russian troops in a prompt and complete manner. The study analysed the principles of organisation of the total defence system by public administration bodies of the Scandinavian and Baltic States. It was proved that at the present stage of the country’s defence, the concept of strengthening the resilience of the country’s social, economic, and military potential should be the most expedient. It was substantiated that in a high-intensity positional war, effective public administration should be based on the concept of resilience, which is systematically linked to the doctrine of total defence of Ukraine. The findings of this study can be used by governments and civil society institutions for management and coordination strategies for agencies in times of war

■ **Keywords:** preservation of statehood; state security; management system; resilience; economic stability

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## ■ Introduction

The Moscow Kremlin’s transformation of a low-intensity hybrid war into a full-scale high-intensity war along almost the entire state border between Ukraine and Russia has created existential threats not only for Ukraine but also for other European countries. The experience of Ukraine’s struggle in the extremely difficult conditions of a high-intensity war shows that the problem of strengthening and developing the factors of state resilience in modern war-time conditions is becoming increasingly relevant. Threats to the stability of the state are increasing due to modification of the tools of hybrid warfare, formation of corruption networks of collaborators, and activation of dormant Kremlin agents; the Russian rulers’ increasing the scale of destruction of Ukraine through the increasingly intensive use of missiles, aircraft, and guided aerial bombs, a large occupation military contingent, etc.; a general decline in the quality of public administration due to inefficient and populist techniques of exercising power.

Many researchers have investigated the impact of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine on the European security architecture, including L. Bazhunaishvili & I. Gorgiladze (2022) and M. Kozub & A. Mitreġa (2023). The latter emphasise that this war has changed not only the European security architecture, but also the international understanding of Ukraine’s significance as one of the principal factors in maintaining stability and security in Europe. Y. Alshamy *et al.* (2024) noted that, contrary to the predictions of many experts, the Ukrainian army still proved to be resilient to a full-scale invasion by the Russian army. The researchers also note that to explain this phenomenon, many have pointed to the prevalence of corruption in the Russian Federation, which ranks 136<sup>th</sup> among the least corrupt governments. Therewith, corruption in Ukraine is also high, as it ranks 122<sup>nd</sup>, and therefore the researchers suggest paying attention to the polycentric nature of the initial stage of Ukraine’s defence in a full-scale war.

A. Kudlenko (2023) explores the sources of Ukraine’s resilience. It is noted that the role of volunteering in Ukraine (since 2014 and as of 2024 inclusive) has been and continues to be important in resisting Russian aggression. It was also noted that horizontal networks in communities should be fully supported and invested in the development of the

volunteer sector. M. Rabinovych *et al.* (2023) examine aspects of the theoretical interpretation of the concept of resilience and analyse the possibilities of explaining Ukraine’s resilience in the face of full-scale Russian aggression by the growing role and capacity of local territorial communities created by the decentralisation reform after 2014.

M.S. Nazarov (2020) assesses the problem of national resilience to a full-scale invasion of Russian troops. The study points out that the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas have revealed systemic gaps in Ukraine’s national security. The researcher emphasises the need to think about possible alternative strategies in the field of security and defence of Ukraine. It is concluded that the development of national resilience is possible due to the well-developed civil society and volunteerism in Ukraine, which is an integral part of ensuring resilience. O. Reznikova (2022) examines the options for the content of the “national resilience” construct. The report by S. Pyrozhev (2022) conceptualises the priority areas and general stages of implementation of the national resilience strategy of Ukraine. V. Palyvoda (2020) analyses Poland’s practices in approaching the problem of implementing the “total defence” doctrine and emphasises the fundamental responsibility of the political leadership for implementing fundamental changes in the security environment, as well as prompt rethinking of approaches to ensuring the comprehensive national (military) security of the state.

The study highlights the problem of scientific and practical construction of the content of the comprehensive doctrine of mobilisation of defence resources of Ukraine based on social self-organisation and improvement of the efficiency of public authorities and the public administration system. The purpose of this study was to investigate the effectiveness of the management of the national security and defence system of the state, specifically, to analyse the key aspects that affect its functioning and ability to respond to threats.

## ■ Materials and Methods

For this, an array of factual, scientific, and analytical materials was processed, grouped into four blocks, the components of which are presented in Table 1.

**Table 1.** Characteristics of the reviewed materials

Information block	Sources
Information reports on current events in the socio-political and public administration process in the field of national security and defence in the media of the national, regional, and local scale	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ New military doctrine. What defence strategy will Ukraine implement (2021)</li> <li>■ Everything you need to know about national defence and national resistance (2022)</li> <li>■ S. Zvorych (2022)</li> </ul>
Analytical developments, sociological studies, and articles that explore aspects of the problems of state sustainability and resilience in the face of threats and challenges of high-intensity war and martial law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ V. Palyvoda (2020)</li> <li>■ O. Reznikova (2022)</li> <li>■ O. Reznik (2022)</li> <li>■ M. Lobko <i>et al.</i> (2022)</li> <li>■ O. S. Bondarenko (2023)</li> <li>■ Y. Alshamy <i>et al.</i> (2024)</li> </ul>

Table 1. Continued

Information block	Sources
Laws of Ukraine, Decrees of the President of Ukraine, other official state defence planning documents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Law of Ukraine No. 1702-IX “On the Foundations of National Resistance” (2021)</li> <li>■ Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 121/2021 “On the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine ‘On the Military Security Strategy of Ukraine’” (2021)</li> <li>■ Strategy of Military Security of Ukraine “Military Security – Comprehensive Defence” (2021)</li> <li>■ Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 479/2021 “On the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine ‘On the Implementation of the National Resilience System’” (2021)</li> <li>■ The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted in the second reading and as a whole Law No. 10449 “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Certain Issues of Military Service, Mobilisation and Military Registration” (2024)</li> </ul>
Statements by officials and decisions of public authorities and public administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Abnormal situation – Zelensky comments on Khomchak-Taran conflict for the first time (2021)</li> <li>■ Vitaliy Klytschko appealed to the people of Kyiv, who care about the country’s future: Join territorial defence to protect your families and your city (2022)</li> <li>■ Decision of the City Council No. 16/VIII-8 “On the Program for the Preparation of Territorial Defence and Preparation of the Population of Chernihiv for Participation in the National Resistance Movement for 2022-2023” (2022)</li> <li>■ Territorial defence of Chernihiv. What does the mayor propose? (2022)</li> </ul>

Source: compiled by the authors of this study

A series of methods and research concepts were employed in a comprehensive manner to process the content, understand the essence of the materials under study, understand and objectively interpret the complexity of the aspects of the topic under study, and formulate relevant conclusions: systemic and structural approach and grouping of information by essential typological and/or structural features; general scientific methods of logic, analysis, and synthesis; comparative and chronological-evolutionary research methods; logical methods of scientific induction and deduction; progressive-regressive method of cognition and interpretation (Zubrytska, 1996), which focuses on understanding and explaining the phenomena of social and managerial processes as recursive-semantic interaction of three time dimensions: past, present, and future; synergistic concept of social self-organisation and optimisation of public administration. The use of these methods helped not only to analyse the research materials, but also to gain a more profound understanding of the development and interaction of various aspects of social and governance processes. This has opened opportunities for effective formulation of conclusions and recommendations aimed at improving governance practices and social transformations in war-time. Based on a systematic approach, factual, review, and analytical materials from official state and alternative (Ukrainian and foreign) sources, the study interpreted the situation of the state’s defence that was formed before the beginning of the Russian war against Ukraine.

## ■ Results and Discussion

In 2014, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), with the help of volunteer battalions, managed to localise the war zone. The basis for these successes was the managerial decisions

and diplomatic efforts of Ukraine’s public administration bodies, which were renewed in 2014 on the wave of patriotic upsurge. In 2014-2019, Ukraine lived, worked, and fought in a hybrid war waged by the Russian Federation against it. Over this time, Ukraine’s public administration system has gradually adapted to the specifics of the war and learned to deal with the “direct” methods of hybrid warfare aimed at destroying the ideological foundations of statehood and fuelling inter-ethnic and inter-confessional confrontation. Therewith, the “indirect” methods of hybrid warfare in the area of forming collaborative political parties, NGOs and media that were guided by the Kremlin’s playbooks, permanently created an atmosphere of distrust and disobedience towards the current legally elected state authorities (Ilnytskyi *et al.*, 2022). At the same time, the state authorities and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with the help of state security and law enforcement agencies, were constantly fighting three localised hotbeds of military aggression (Crimea, Donetsk Oblast, Luhansk Oblast). The significant costs of this localised war and the government’s fear of losing popularity because of a sharp decline in living standards prevented it from increasing the defence budget and funding for the growth of the Armed Forces sufficiently in 2014-2019. Notably, at the beginning of 2022, the basis of the combat capability of the AFU was the insufficiently large contingent that gained combat experience in the local phase of the war in 2014-2021 (Zvarych, 2022).

In 2019, as a result of the presidential and parliamentary elections, there was a dramatic change in the political framework of the public administration system due to the effectiveness of the populist technology used (Scherbak, 2023). The leaders of the new governance system received their powers and responsibilities without, for the

most part, having any experience in public administration or experience in political parties. As a result, they failed to recognise the risks and threats of a localised war escalating into a full-scale war in time. The structural and functional analysis of relevant events and documents shows that in 2019-2020, work on increasing the material and technical support of the Armed Forces, forming an effective mobilisation resource, and preparing the general population for the country's defence was virtually suspended (The Accounting Chamber..., 2023).

The Servant of the People political party, established in 2017, quickly became the dominant mono-majority in the legislative body, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and formed the government in 2019. Comparative and chronological-evolutionary methods suggest that neither the mono-majority of the Servants of the People nor the government of O. Honcharuk, and later the government of D. Shmyhal, managed to promptly process the experience of the hybrid phase of the local war of the previous years. The ruling party's parliamentarians and government officials failed to recognise the need to immediately strengthen all areas of the national security and defence sector with experienced professionals with a proven patriotic background. The use of scientific induction and deduction proves, specifically, that in 2020-2021, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (MoD) failed to ensure the production of weapons necessary for the country's defence, including the production of shells (Why was the production..., 2022). Instead of strengthening the organisation of arms supplies to the Armed Forces and enhancing the combat training of their personnel, the then Commander-in-Chief R. Khomchak and the then Minister of Defence A. Taran spent their time organising mutual confrontation (Abnormal situation..., 2021). And the quality of the AFU's management improved only after the appointment of the commander of the troops of the Operational Command “North” V. Zaluzhnyi (2019-2021) as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU (2021-2024).

The methods of induction and deduction applied in a cyclic-recursive manner to the problem of understanding and interpreting the shortcomings of defence organisation suggest that one of the key factors of the insufficient effectiveness of public administration in the security and defence sector of Ukraine was the threats and risks to the sustainability of the national security of the state in 2021 were not promptly recognised and considered by the Ukrainian state authorities; the threats of a “great war” were not recognised in January-February 2022, even though at that time there were repeated substantive reports from the international intelligence community about the high probability of an attack. Evidence suggests that international partners have already directly informed the Ukrainian authorities about the sharp increase in the threat of a full-scale war in the second half of February (The historical parallels..., 2023). However, on 22-23 February 2022, officials of the central public administration did not issue an order to prepare the border troops, to prepare enhanced airfield protection, and

to put the units of the Armed Forces, Territorial Defence Forces, National Police, and National Guard on full combat alert (Haj-Nyzhnyk, 2022). Based on the structural and functional analysis of the basic components of national resilience, the formation of spontaneous factors of “total local self-defence” is noted.

Conscientious citizens-patriots (How Mariupol..., 2022) and local government officials (e.g., Kyiv Mayor V. Klychko, Chernihiv Mayor V. Atroshenko, Okhtyrka Mayor P. Kuzmenko) have repeatedly stressed the immediate need to prepare for the threat of a full-scale invasion (Vitaliy Klychko appealed..., 2022; Reznik, 2022). On 27 January 2022, the Chernihiv City Council adopted Decision of the City Council No. 16/VIII-8 “On the Programme for the Preparation of Territorial Defence and Preparation of the Population of Chernihiv for Participation in the National Resistance Movement for 2022-2023” (2022). On 22 February 2022, the mayor of Chernihiv, V. Atroshenko, held an operational meeting, at which he stressed that the city council would do everything to form a terrorist defence force. At this operational meeting, the mayor of Chernihiv also proposed to expand the circle of reservists and mobilise people to protect the city's critical infrastructure (Territorial defence of Chernihiv..., 2022). However, Ukraine's national defence system was not activated on time. Just as other important proposals to improve Ukraine's national security and defence system were not considered in time (Nazarov, 2020; Reznikova, 2022). Based on the systemic and structural approach and grouping of relevant and reliable information, it can be concluded that in the absence of a developed and approved doctrine of “total defence” in Ukraine, not many officials whose responsibilities included the organisation of defence were ready for its actual organisation. Thus, the enemy was partially able to take the country by surprise, as the Ukrainian public administration system as a whole was not prepared to repel the aggression promptly.

The progressive-regressive method of learning about trends and relevant facts indicates the following. Despite the suddenness of the attack, on the morning of 24 February 2022, the Armed Forces Command, the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) headed by D. Monastyrskyi, and the leadership of the State Border Guard Service quickly managed to organise some effective resistance in the North and Centre of Ukraine in most areas of the Russian army's offensive. Units of the regular army of Ukraine, together with volunteers from the Territorial Defence Forces of Ukraine and spontaneously joined citizen volunteers, fought extremely hard against the heavily armed forces of the invaders, which were several times superior. However, in the south of Ukraine, when leaving Crimea, the enemy occupied a territory of thousands of square kilometres in a few days without any obstacles and without organised resistance. This indicates that if the doctrine of “total defence” had been implemented in 2020, Ukraine would not have suffered such human and territorial losses. It is worth recalling that the Territorial Defence Forces were created with a considerable

delay only shortly before the invasion began, based on the Law of Ukraine No. 1702-IX “On the Foundations of National Resistance” (2021). The formation of the Territorial Defence Forces was to be completed by 15 February 2022 (Fediyenko, 2022; Everything you need..., 2022). In 2022-2023, at the cost of the Armed Forces’ efforts, with the help of citizen volunteers who were forced to take up arms on short notice without adequate training, they managed to defend Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and other cities and villages, liberate Kherson from occupation, and push the enemy back from Kharkiv. There were other successful operations. However, the occupation forces’ mining of the occupied territories, construction of fortifications using the production capacity of Russian enterprises, the explosion of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station and other circumstances limited the possibility of conducting a manoeuvre war to de-occupy the South and East of Ukraine.

By the beginning of autumn 2023, the war had become a positional war with the depletion of military, mobilisation, and economic resources of both belligerents. In January-February 2024, the attention and energy of civil society was constrained by the removal of Commander-in-Chief General V. Zaluzhnyi from the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At the same time, the Russian occupation army launched a massive offensive in the area of Avdiivka using guided aerial bombs, which soon ended in the loss of this important stronghold. This situation urgently requires both an increase in the ability of all public authorities to produce the resources necessary to resist the aggressor’s pressure and an increase in the overall level of resilience of the “country-state-society-citizens” system. The volunteer movement to support the Armed Forces became one of the amateur areas of development of the flexibility of public administration needed in wartime. It is critical for strengthening organisational and mental links between the levels and components of the “country-state-society-citizens” system.

However, even in this rather narrow segment of the flexibility of public figures and concerned citizens to respond to the needs of the country’s defence, problems often arise. As a rule, they are created by officials’ attempts to regulate volunteer activities to provide opportunities for corrupt practices for officials. A considerable number of officials still believe that the state is the property of officials and that it is possible to “boost” ratings and “extract rent” through high ratings. And ratings can be easily “stimulated” by populist technologies. This is a short-sighted and, in times of war, even criminal understanding of the purely personal resilience of a civil servant (official, commander, etc.). At the present stage, “civil servants” are constantly being renamed “public servants”, “employees of public administration bodies”, etc. However, most officials have not yet developed a stable understanding of their personal responsibility for the survival of Ukraine and their personal functional role in the public administration system, even in wartime. Criminal negligence of the interests of the country’s defence is more often observed in the expectation of creating grounds for corruption schemes. To the detriment

of the country’s resilience, in the minds of a sizeable number of officials, every economic transaction, whether in the public sector, private business, or to meet public interests and needs, and even in the field of defence and security, should bring them personal corruption income (Bondarenko, 2023; The Ministry of Defence..., 2023).

Corruption attempts by officials also affect many economic and planning operations necessary to replenish material resources for the state’s defence and address the challenges of Ukraine’s security and resilience (The Accounting Chamber..., 2023; Petyk & Batsman, 2023). At the same time, the synergistic concept indicates that a multi-level system of self-organisation “country-state-society-citizens” should work as an analogue of an integral multi-level biological organism that has a self-regulatory need and purpose to direct the forces of hardiness of all its levels for the survival of the entire system (Cherlenyak, 2010). Corruption, as a process that destroys the stability of the state as a self-regulating organism, must be eradicated from the state at least for the duration of the total full-scale war. A systematic approach to defence and security issues allows understanding that an essential aspect of the flexibility and resilience of the system of public administration bodies and institutions of Ukraine at the current stage of war is the problem of effective management of the development of the concept, substantiation of the doctrine, and implementation of the practice of “total defence”. Certain steps were taken in this area, but, as wartime showed, they were not effective enough. In 2020-2021, when a new military doctrine was being developed, the foundations of which were presented in the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 121/2021 “On the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine ‘On the Military Security Strategy of Ukraine’” (2021), military analysts and experts foresaw the need and possibility of developing the concept of total defence. However, the final document still contained a substantially vaguer wording – “all-encompassing defence”. Therewith, the term “all-encompassing” here refers not to the depth of the problem, but to the breadth of the list of areas of possible threats.

According to the aforementioned deterrence strategy, in the context of Ukraine’s comprehensive defence, it is envisaged to repel armed aggression against Ukraine at the expense of the readiness of the Ukrainian defence forces; the national economy; the population; the entire state (Strategy of Military Security of Ukraine..., 2021). The document also points to the need to develop the capabilities of the Armed Forces, such as air defence and other branches of the armed forces. It also mentions the need to create an integrated system of territorial defence, but does not even make provision for a purpose, let alone a programme of training the population to take part in territorial defence. Upon a systemic approach, total defence is first and foremost a link between all possible levels of existence, sustainability, and resilience of the “state (government)-country-society-citizens” system. But in the content of this state regulatory document, the resilience of

the state and its defence system is factually reduced to the doctrine of “resistance mechanics”. The same document also uses the term “state resilience”, but in the following narrow context: “resilience in comprehensive defence of Ukraine is achieved... by maintaining the ability to carry out strategic deployment, territorial defence of Ukraine, resistance movement...” (Strategy of Military Security of Ukraine..., 2021). However, when describing the aspects of “all-encompassing defence”, the need to establish reliable channels of communication between the state authorities and the population is pointed out.

The concept of total defence is absent from the final version of this potentially crucial document. And this is even though the term “total defence” is included in the national security doctrines of the Baltic states, Norway, and Sweden. That is, all countries that remember history and consider Russia as a potential “total enemy” (New military doctrine..., 2021). The structural-functional analysis shows the Ukraine, apart from military and political problems, also suffers from certain institutional and legal problems for the introduction and implementation of an effective doctrine of “total defence”. The inhibiting factor is, specifically, the fact that the existing state mechanism lacks a real factor of political responsibility of the President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for the actions (inaction) of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (Chornous, 2011). This situation reduces the effectiveness of the entire executive branch, which is essential in wartime. The problems of creating a doctrine and practice of “total defence” are urgent for the qualitative and rapid improvement of the efficiency of all levels of public (state) management of the country’s defence in times of war. These problems are organisational, legal, and psychological. For instance, the development and functioning of territorial defence forces based on the doctrine of total defence in Estonia is ensured by a profoundly layered system of incentives to motivate Estonian citizens to join the national defence. Even in peacetime, the question in Estonia is put as follows: the education of each generation should be based on the ideological imperative of readiness to allocate part of one’s free time and the time of the professional career of every healthy citizen to prepare for national defence (Estonian Ministry of Defence, 2010).

A synergistic approach to optimising public administration of the defence sector suggests that a practically effective, rather than purely declarative and imitative, solution to the problem of Ukraine’s resilience should begin with the introduction of the following modes of organisation/self-organisation: rapid but high-quality development of an idea; popularisation of an idea; development and popularisation of a moral “maxim”; philosophical substantiation of the national ideological doctrine; respective legislative substantiation and regulatory support (Cherlennyak, 2010). However, this process should not become a formality beneficial to inactive and inefficient officials, as is often the case. The renaming of regional state administrations into regional military administrations did not automatically

create a new quality of defence management. Especially when they are usually not led by professional military personnel from the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, who have real frontline combat experience and the moral right to be called “military administration”. Moreover, such renaming merely removed officials from public scrutiny and only formally brought the regions of Ukraine closer to the simplified concept of “general defence”. But total defence is much more than a formally established “general defence” or “all-encompassing defence”. A total defence doctrine suitable for the full-fledged organisation of the relevant levels, segments, and units of effective total defence in each region and in each territorial community should first of all practically envisage, develop, and use a respective ideology; individual and social morality; resources (including financial and legal); responsibility and authority. It is in this focus that it is necessary to ensure real responsibility and mutual control of the following public authorities and public administration entities: local territorial communities and their bodies (local self-government); regional territorial communities and regional public administration bodies; law enforcement agencies; the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; the President of Ukraine; the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; and civil society institutions and agencies.

In many critical areas, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with the support of patriotic groups of citizens and patriotic public administration officials, managed to put up a strong resistance to the invaders according to the concept of “resistance at any cost” (The level of stability..., 2023). According to the authors of this study, this is what ultimately made the occupation of Kyiv and Kharkiv impossible and preserved the foundations of Ukraine’s resilience. However, in a long-term positional war, the concept of enhancing the capabilities of “resistance at any cost” is not promising enough. In the new conditions of a positional war of attrition, to solve the problem of radically improving the joint effectiveness of the public administration and military management systems, it is necessary to develop national defence and security doctrines based on the understanding that resistance, resilience, and survivability are related but fundamentally different semantic constructs.

In his report, delivered in the first months of the full-scale war at a meeting of the Presidium of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, S. Pyrozhev (2022) the need to transition from the concept of resistance through hardiness to the concept of resistance and struggle through resilience in the dimension of the state. The authors of the current study share the significance of this thesis. Therewith, in different sciences, the concepts of hardiness and resilience have rather complicated mutual correspondences. In the dimension of an individual, social psychology also defines the concept of hardiness. It is ensured by such adaptive personal characteristics as stress resistance, emotional stability, and emotional intelligence. Resilience in the dimension of a social community (social group) is the ability to find such internal forces and resources that they are effective in dealing with the crisis.



M. Ganor & Y. Ben-Lavy (2003) believe that resilience should become a higher degree of adaptation and flexibility to the situation. S. Jackson & T.L.J. Ferris (2012) believe that in the country and state dimension, social (or societal) resilience forms an integral part of national resilience and is defined as the preservation of the nation-state's ability to maintain its social cohesion when faced with external or internal conflicts caused by socio-political change and/or violent unrest. Resilience is the ability (potential or manifested) of a dynamic system to successfully adapt to disturbances that threaten the system's functioning, survivability or development, positive adaptation or development in the context of negative impact. O. Reznikova (2022) emphasises that resilience in the state dimension primarily implies the ability of the state and society to effectively counter threats of any origin and nature, adapt to changes in the security environment, maintain their sustainable functioning, and quickly recover from crises to the level of equilibrium that is optimal under certain conditions.

In the area of social self-organisation, Ukraine's overall resilience should, among other things, include both the potential for immediate response to sharp situational threats and the ability to adapt key processes of a dynamic system to the content of challenges that threaten its survivability over extended periods of time. Accordingly, the two formally close semantic constructs of hardiness and resilience in the relevant project formulation "challenge-issue-task-solution algorithm" in the context of this war should become the systemic basis of two essentially different doctrines of formation and support of sources and resources of Ukraine's defence in the short-term (hardiness) and long-term (resilience). The doctrine of "defence hardiness" is in fact always mechanistic. In the context of the topic, the doctrine of "hardiness" and its corresponding strategy of adequate military resistance is based on the organisation of resistance to aggression by the state administration with the forces and means of the subordinate Armed Forces and law enforcement agencies based on those pre-prepared resources that are operationally controlled by state bodies and international aid agreements. There are situations when, in the short term, in a certain local area, it is expedient or necessary to quickly use the doctrine of resistance-hardiness.

However, it is necessary to consider the thesis of Y.T. Maru (2010) that in the context of social, psychological, and ecological systems, the term "resistance" adequately describes the ability of the system to withstand the immediate (current) consequences of stressful situations and ensure its return to normal functioning in conditions comparable to those that preceded the crisis event. Developing this thesis, Ukraine needs to consider the following factors and processes to win a long-term war: resistance is a special state of tension in a system; tension needs to be provided with a safety margin and supply flows to restore resistance forces; the reconstruction of links between system components necessary for the existence of resistance may, after some time, cause a stable dysfunction of the

system in a changed environment; when the nature and character of the threat changes, the construct of "familiar resistance" becomes ineffective. Developing the concept of S. Pyrozhev (2022), the authors of the current study argue that the doctrine-concept of "resilience" in the dimension of the country's "past-present-future" relations is more organic and multivariate in the context of a long-term war of attrition than the concept of "resistance hardiness". The doctrine and strategy of mobilising resources of the system "state-country-society-citizens" should be based on semantic constructions of dynamic (organic) vitality. In fact, the following triad should always be kept in mind: resilience-hardiness-survivability. For systematic modelling of the content of operational, tactical, and strategic tasks of Ukraine's development and hardiness in war, it is necessary to apply a corresponding group of relevant concepts: in relation to the problems of operational repulsion of aggression in the context of the possibilities of providing resources for resistance; in relation to the problems of adaptive reconstruction of Ukraine as a dynamic system in a long-term life cycle of resilience.

Notably, Ukraine's resilience, hardiness, and survivability depend on the interaction and struggle of negative and positive factors, both of an "internal systemic" and external nature. It is worth emphasising that public authorities should always consider that the profound ties of the system "state-country-society-citizens" are based on the people's love for their native land, for their kin and family, for the bright pages of their history, culture, and traditions, which preserve the memory of the valour and virtue of its historical heroes. In response to this historical challenge, the current public authorities need to modify the content of internal policy to become the ideological, moral, and organisational core of the state's resilience system. Ukraine's hardiness requires a harmonious combination of the integrity of the semantic core and historical roots of the state's resilience with the flexibility of democratic public administration approaches to solving operational and tactical tasks and strategic challenges of the war of attrition.

The authors of this study support the thesis of V. Palyvoda (2020) that the doctrine of total defence should be understood and comprehended by the entire society. Preparation of citizens for total defence should be carried out with the active and persistent work of all state institutions, as well as with the active support of non-governmental organisations. The newly adopted Law of Ukraine No. 10449 "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Certain Issues of Military Service, Mobilisation and Military Registration" (2024) should become one of the key strategic steps and substantive blocks in the development of Ukraine's defence potential. However, it is not organically linked to the need for and doctrine of "total defence". Therefore, it becomes a purely "mechanistic" document of "resistance hardiness" that does not increase the ability of society to self-organise in the time of war of attrition. Moreover, the controversial process and procedure of its adoption led to partial disorganisation of society. To ensure

the synergy of society and the state, the initiative in developing and implementing the doctrine and practice of total defence must belong primarily to the President of Ukraine as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The Parliament of Ukraine and the Government of Ukraine should also play a vital ideological and organisational role in this matter. The search for answers to the threats of sabotage groups infiltrating the regions of Ukraine (specifically, Sumy and Chernihiv regions), the deployment of psychological aggression technologies (pro-Moscow “telegram channels”, intimidation and demoralisation of the population, rocket attacks and destruction of energy facilities) is not a narrow issue of “documenting”. This is a fundamental issue of the sustainability of public authorities represented by the entire nation and the resilience of those public figures who synergistically recognise and promptly implement the will of the people in relevant management models and decisions. Total defence is a doctrine of responsibility and actions of the people as a source of public power, and a guide for the authorities and institutions as its strategic executors. The doctrine and practice of Ukraine’s total defence should directly apply to legislative, executive, judicial, military (in wartime) authorities; all segments of the population, regardless of age and gender. Therefore, all state and non-governmental institutions should be involved in educational and patriotic training of all participants in this defence system. Its systematic nature should be universal and comprehensive. The President, the Parliament, the Government, ministries, and heads of territorial communities should be personally responsible for the effectiveness of the “total defence” system.

Military experts M. Lobko *et al.* (2022) also point out that both central government and local government and self-government bodies organised and carried out defence in 2022 unsuccessfully. Therewith, they emphasise that the interaction between the state authorities, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other military formations and law enforcement agencies was insufficiently effective. The authors of the present study fully agree with this statement. Moreover, this situation has arisen precisely because Ukraine does not have its own doctrine of “total defence”. The authors of the study are convinced that the qualitative development, legal support, and practical implementation of Ukraine’s “total defence” doctrine is also of international significance, as it will lead to a qualitative improvement of the European security architecture as a whole. It is worth recalling that military experts considered the introduction of a “total defence” system to be relevant in 2020-2022, but then lacked the managerial courage to organise their solution. In 2024, these issues have become even more pressing. The situation in which Ukraine has found itself since the beginning of the full-scale invasion is still exceedingly difficult. Many segments of the state administration and public authorities were indeed unprepared for systemic defence and long-term resistance. Therewith, some problems and issues are slowly being resolved. However, there is a need to emphasise that even in 2024, it is still difficult and too

slow to build high-quality defensive fortifications in the areas of possible offensive by the Russian occupation forces. And this is even though the public and the media are again repeatedly discussing precedents and risks of large-scale corruption. An analysis of the resistance of Ukrainian citizens to the Russian military invasion organised in February-March 2022 showed how strategically important are systematic and planned defence actions.

The authors of this study share the opinion of V. Palyvoda (2020) that the experience of states such as Norway, Sweden, Finland, Israel, Poland, Singapore, Estonia, etc., in applying the doctrine of “total defence” proves the benefits of preventive planning of actions to resist external aggression. According to the authors of the current study, the development and adoption of the Total Defence of Ukraine doctrine will allow for a rapid and qualitative increase in the resilience of the state and the army. This doctrine should ensure the sequence of stages in the formation of the following defence actors resistant to crisis challenges and stressful situations: an individual citizen, each public authority official, and society as a self-organising whole. This doctrine should ensure the emergence and functioning of effective public authorities and public administration bodies and functionaries, even in crisis conditions. We are convinced that the threat of corruption can be quickly eliminated if the doctrine of “total defence”, specifically, makes provision for the moral and “official” obligation of immediate atonement for corruption by officials of all branches and bodies of state power in military service on the front line for at least 6 months. The authors of this study also share the opinion of O.S. Bondarenko (2023) on the negative role of elevated levels of corruption on the level of Ukraine’s defence capability. When developing the doctrine and legal support for total defence, it is necessary to clearly consider that the extensive networks of corrupt business created over 33 years often focus on the interests of the Kremlin’s special services. Corruption networks have now become not only a lever of political and economic influence on the Ukrainian authorities. They have become significant economic agents in the political and economic system of Ukraine with considerable capital accounts in both Ukrainian and international banks. It was through corruption networks and schemes that these firms and corporations provided funding for pro-Moscow TV channels, newspapers, and social media segments that were supposed to inform the Ukrainian population about Moscow’s occupation.

At the same time, the Kremlin’s special services, using the above-mentioned corruption networks in Ukraine’s economy, can intensify the emergence and functioning of sustainable corruption schemes in the judiciary, executive, and legislative branches. This duality of defence and self-defence of corruption networks allows them to create effective criminal schemes even in times of war. That is, to provide “total security” for participants in corruption networks in industry, energy, agriculture, and mining sectors linked to the interests of politicians and special services

of the Kremlin. One clear example of this anti-Ukrainian policy of corruption networks in the past was the privatisation of Ukraine's powerful primary aluminium metallurgy enterprises, which destroyed the development of Ukraine's own military aviation (Prygunova *et al.*, 2022). Another well-known example is the case of V. Bohuslayev, who was arrested on 24 October 2022 and was the *de facto* head and owner of the strategically important enterprise for the production of military helicopters "Motor Sich", which sold military equipment and components for the needs of the Russian army (Ex-president of "Motor Sich"..., 2024).

The level of stability and cohesion of citizens of Ukraine (according to the results of sociological research) (2023), based on the analysis of sociological research conducted in the second half of 2023, draws the following important practical conclusions: 1) the resilience of Ukrainian society to the challenges of war is quite significant; 2) the situation may change depending on the deterioration of the economic situation or the situation at the front; 3) the resilience of society also depends on its psychological state, specifically, on the feelings associated with its country. The authors of the current study agree with these practical conclusions. In this regard, and in the light of the above arguments, it is necessary to immediately start developing the doctrine of "total defence" at the level of competence of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Institute of the President of Ukraine. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine should consolidate around the task of legislating and consolidating the foundations of total defence. We are convinced that in creating a Ukrainian doctrine of total defence, the proven experience of the Scandinavian and Baltic states should be used first of all. It is worth agreeing with the opinion of V. Palyvoda (2020) that it is worth investigating the practices of the Polish Government in this area. The author's analysis confirms the view that the doctrines of "total defence" have a dual content focus: introduction of a system of defence means to minimise the success of a potential enemy; ensuring the survival of the state and society in the face of a potential military invasion of the country's territory. Therewith, in Ukraine, the doctrine of total defence should include a third substantive area: merciless and serious punishment for corruption under martial law. Notably, in the context of Ukraine's current war for its sovereignty and state survival, a fourth content area is needed: increasing the level of responsibility, a sense of belonging to the people, developing spirituality and cohesion, especially among the wealthy strata of society in patriotic hardening. This applies primarily to officials of state executive authorities, intelligence officers, police officers, judges, MPs, businesspeople, customs officers, intermediary firms, and the gambling business. All this should be supported by a qualitative leap in the level of skills and knowledge of state authorities, both the "supreme" military and political leadership and members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and all public officials. Particular attention should be paid by citizens and civil society to the development of such socio-political conditions in which the improvement of the

competences of members of the Ukrainian parliament will become a personal necessity for each parliamentarian and a "condition of parliamentary existence" for the party that brought them to the parliament.

The authors of this study ask scientists, the public, and the authorities to draw their attention to the fact that effective public administration and democracy of the appropriate quality can quickly become a systemic competitive advantage of Ukraine over Russia. It should be recalled that in a democracy there is a dynamic problem of unity of sources of public power due to the diversity of interests of social and property strata, differences in the political culture of citizens, and interests of political parties, which only together and in a coordinated manner can effectively express the will of the people as the sovereign power holder. To be ready to achieve the common goals of sustainability in the "state-country-society-citizens" system, synergy between public authorities and active segments and groups of society is necessary. There is a need for an ideology of unselfish responsibility for the sustainability of the state, which should be demonstrated primarily by the Ukrainian authorities. Synergy and a sense of mutual responsibility should offset the existing political strife and misunderstandings. It is necessary for officials of the current government to reject the technologies of daily populism in the struggle for power and find the strength to lead the country to the development and clear implementation of the doctrine and strategy of "total defence" (Burdiug, 2023). A suitable option for creating such synergy at the present stage may be the formation of a "Government of National Unity" that can focus the most competent representatives of patriotic forces on governing the state.

One of the key prerequisites for the success of the "total defence" strategy is the development of the psychological readiness of an organised society to resist the aggressor. The educational and training aspect and the psychological factor are also important for effective resistance, as they facilitate the adaptation of citizens to act in emergency situations of risk and threat. For the practical implementation of "total defence", it is also necessary to prepare a reasonable and fair legal basis and broad regulatory support. However, this is insufficient: it is necessary to develop, substantiate, explain, and cultivate a relevant ideological doctrine of active patriotism that harmonises the worldview and self-awareness of national, regional, and local communities in the interests of Ukraine's total defence.

Y. Alshamy *et al.* (2024) believe that it was the polycentric defence of Ukraine's regions in February-March 2022 that ensured the defeat of Russian troops during this period by the Ukrainian defence forces. Moreover, they believe that this result reflects the overall benefits of polycentric systems, as they are generally more adaptive and resilient. The authors of the current study partially agree with this thesis. But this thesis is valid only within the framework of short-term "resistance at all costs" based on the doctrine of resilience. Instead, we emphasise that the long-term destruction of all spheres of state life caused by the

war can only be countered by a sophisticatedly organised polycentric system of “state-country-society-citizens”. This multi-level organised system cyclically reproduces itself in the interaction of such semantic and activity images, which, from a certain perspective, always have somewhat contradictory parts and combinations: historical, resource, activity, economic, political, cognitive, and emotional content. This kind of self-organising reproduction requires both a social and political atmosphere of justice and responsibility for the future. It requires an awareness of the need to develop and implement effective defence doctrines and effective plans for Ukraine’s economic development.

When assessing the effectiveness of officials, the public should consider the fact that wartime puts forward new and contradictory requirements for the quality and content of public administration. Complex questions and problems arise about the correlation between directive methods of rigid public administration and more flexible and multivariate methods of public administration. A rigid system, as opposed to a flexible system, cannot withstand sharp shock loads, while a flexible system, by reconstructing surface connections and engaging deep connections, can rebuild, distribute, and extinguish the force of the shock load of the challenges of war. At the same time, the flexible system should not be transformed into schemes for abuse and corruption.

Public administration as a system and a principle, as a process of mutual influence of citizens, territorial communities, social strata, non-governmental organisations and political parties, and state bodies, differ substantially in peacetime and wartime. One of the sources of this transformation is the restrictions that are usually imposed on meetings, rallies, and other public events in wartime for reasons of national security. However, even in such circumstances, democratic control of society over officials at all levels of public authority should still be maintained in a reasonable manner, specifically to reduce corruption. In this regard, O.S. Bondarenko (2023) expressed an extremely relevant opinion on the need to strengthen the legal regime for combating corruption. It is worth emphasising that without such a regime (which is also an important factor of social self-organisation), it is impossible to create an atmosphere of justice and respect for the dignity of the citizen. This includes the dignity of a citizen-soldier. The national security system and the public administration system should interact based on the doctrine of “total defence” of Ukraine in such a way as to create effective practical mechanisms for managing the country’s economy, governance of the state administrative apparatus, the Armed Forces, and law enforcement forces. Overall, a functionally sound solution to the problem of security and building effective strategies of “total defence” depends on the quality of the entire set of regulatory, organisational, managerial, social, group, material and financial, innovative and technological, information and semantic, prognostic and modelling factors. Reconciling them is not an easy task, as it requires, among other things, the systemic eradication of corruption in all these areas. At the same time, all sectoral and general

governance mechanisms should make provision for and ensure a prominent level of responsibility of both the individual politician, civil servant and ordinary citizen to the state and society for the total defence of the country. The mechanisms of social governance should accommodate the reality of wartime and still direct the dynamics of the political regime and public administration, socio-economic and national-cultural development of the multiethnic Ukrainian people to the rails of real, not manipulative, democracy.

## ■ Conclusions

Ukraine’s resilience as a form of dynamic sustainability of the meta-system “state-country-society-citizen” requires constant attention to the expanded reproduction of the security system of the same meta-system based on self-organisation modes. In a broad sense, this is a problem of social self-organisation. In a narrow sense, it implies, first and foremost, the quality institutionalisation of the security system of the state and communities. The sustainability of the state security system can only be responsible, viable, and resilient based on clear rules and requirements understood by both citizens and officials. In the context of the crisis, Ukraine’s resilience can only be ensured through the involvement of broad sections of civil society in the state’s security system. The creation and regulation of a sustainable system of “total defence” in the context of a positional full-scale war is an urgent and necessary condition for Ukraine’s hardiness, resilience and survivability. The development of the state security components should be actively pursued by means of public administration, whose institutions should act as an important bridge between the state, society, and citizens. This should lead to the strengthening of patriotic motives for social self-organisation in the context of preserving the foundations of the democratic regime in Ukraine. This is important because democracy is Ukraine’s valuable competitive advantage over the totalitarian and authoritarian Russian Federation.

In the country’s dimension, effective total defence is impossible without effectively functioning legislative and representative bodies, a flexible executive branch, active local governments and non-governmental civil society institutions, and control of special services to protect the state’s security. The system of total defence requires both state and meticulous public oversight (“reanimated” public control). It is important not only to develop and improve laws and plans, but also to ensure that both government officials and ordinary citizens strictly adhere to the norms and spirit of the relevant laws, strategies, and plans. The need to immediately regulate the responsibilities and powers of all public and military authorities in the area of national security, military, economic, and political stability of Ukraine is a vital requirement of wartime.

Solving these problems requires the daily work of all patriotic factions and committees of the Parliament of Ukraine. The unity and coadaptation of the state and society in the security and defence of the country should immediately become the ideology of Ukraine’s hardiness.

The awareness of unity is also expressed in the possibility of civil society control over the authorities and institutions of power, and in the accompaniment of public administration with the processes of preparing citizens for emergencies, conflicts, and war based on the doctrine of “total resistance”. Training should be organised in families, educational institutions, and workplaces in state and non-state institutions. Systematic basic training in security and “total resistance” should become a vital necessity for every citizen of Ukraine. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, this is the only way for Ukraine to successfully resist the Kremlin’s long-term military and political expansion and not only guarantee Ukraine’s security, but also improve the architecture of pan-European security. Prospects for further research in this area include a detailed analysis of the advantages of

international total defence doctrines, conditions, and strategies for their application; investigation of the possible impact of these strategies on the stability and development of the state in war and the post-war period; developing recommendations for effective systemic and public management of national security and defence of Ukraine.

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### ■ Conflict of Interest

None.

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## Ефективне управління та доктрина «тотальної оборони» як фактори стійкості держави в умовах воєнного часу

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■ **Анотація.** У воєнний час ефективне управління та доктрина «тотальної оборони» є критично важливими факторами, які забезпечують стабільність, безпеку та суверенітет держави. Метою цієї роботи було дослідити аспекти ефективності управління системою національної безпеки і оборони держави. Використано аналітичне моделювання системних складових стійкості України у воєнний час через призму доктрини тотальної оборони та концепції суспільної самоорганізації. Досліджено бар'єри та труднощі підготовки системи публічної влади України до ефективного управління опором загрозам гібридної війни та загрозам повномасштабної війни високої інтенсивності вздовж усієї лінії державного кордону України з РФ. Проаналізовано особливості етапу гібридної війни низької інтенсивності 2014–2021 років та особливості початкового етапу війни високої інтенсивності 2022 року. Розглянуто здобутки, упущення, недоробки та помилки органів влади і посадових осіб системи публічного управління на перших етапах повномасштабного вторгнення окупаційних військ РФ в області та міста і села України. Встановлено, що як система організації державного управління національною безпекою та обороною, так і законодавче та нормативно-правове забезпечення підготовки військового та промислового потенціалу країни не відповідали тому рівню загроз, які були сформовані військово-політичним керівництвом РФ у 2021 році та особливо в січні – лютому 2022 року. Показано, що внаслідок цього сили оборони України не змогли своєчасно та в повній мірі забезпечити організацію ефективної відсічі широкомасштабному вторгненню військ РФ. Проаналізовано принципи організації системи тотальної оборони органами публічного управління скандинавських і прибалтійських держав. Доведено, що на сучасному етапі оборони країни найбільш доцільною є концепція посилення резильєнтності соціального, економічного та військового потенціалу країни. Обґрунтовано, що в умовах позиційної війни високої інтенсивності ефективне державне управління має базуватися на такій концепції резильєнтності, що системно зв'язана з доктриною тотальної оборони України. Результати розвідки можуть бути використані органами публічного управління та інституціями громадянського суспільства України при розробці і впровадженні ефективних стратегій управління під час війни, а також для покращення координації дій різних відомств у сфері оборони на основі впровадження доктрини тотальної оборони

■ **Ключові слова:** збереження державності; державна безпека; система управління; резильєнтність; економічна стабільність